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Abstract: The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations
plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process
theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance—in relation to the
ontological and epistemological status of representations—is most appropriate. We focus on
non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary
account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural
representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account,
according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and
other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the
model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal
semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a
Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account—an
organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the free-energy principle,
pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to
the kind of semantic content involved in the ‘aboutness’ or intentionality of cognitive systems; our
position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue
that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and
hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.
Keywords: variational free-energy principle; active inference; neural representation; representationalism;
instrumentalism; deflationary
1. Introduction: Neural Representations and Their (Dis)Contents
Representations figure prominently in several human affairs. Human beings routinely use
representational artifacts like maps to navigate their environments. Maps represent the terrain to be
traversed, for an agent capable of reading it and of leveraging the information that it contains to guide
their behavior. It is quite uncontroversial to claim that human beings consciously and deliberately
engage in intellectual tasks, such as theorizing about causes and effects—which entails the ability to
mentally think about situations and states of affairs. Most of us can see in our mind’s eye situations
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past, possible, and fictive, via the imagination and mental imagery, which are traditionally cast in
terms of representational abilities.
In the cognitive sciences, neurosciences, and the philosophy of mind, the concept of representation
has been used to try and explain naturalistically how the fundamental property of ‘aboutness’ or
‘intentionality’ emerges in living systems [1]. Indeed, living creatures must interact with the world in
which they are embedded, and must distinguish environmental features and other organisms that are
relevant for their survival, from those that are not. Living creatures act as if they had beliefs about the
world, about its structure and its denizens, which guide their decision-making processes, especially
with respect to the generation of adaptive action. This property of aboutness is thus a foundational one
for any system that must make probabilistic inferences to support their decision-making in an uncertain
world, which are central to the special issue to which this paper contributes.
In this context, to provide a naturalistic explanation is to explain some phenomenon by appealing to
physical processes [2]. The strategy deployed by cognitive science has been to naturalize intentionality
by postulating the existence of physical structures internal to the agent that carry, encode, or otherwise
bear semantic content; classical accounts include Fodor [3], Millikan [4,5].
In the sciences that study the mind and in philosophy, representations are typically defined as
some internal vehicles—neural representations—that carry semantic content [6]. Representations are
thus physical structures that are internal to an organism; typically, states and processes unfolding
in their brains, which carry or encode representational content. The epistemic role played by neural
representations is to explain how creatures are able to engage with relevant features of their environment
and plan situationally appropriate, adaptive behavior [6,7]. The semantic content of a representation
is what the representation is about, that towards which it stands in an intentional relation—that “in
virtue of what they represent what they do, or get to be ‘about’ what they are about” ([8], p. 2390). The
problem of specifying the nature and origins of semantic content is known as the hard problem of
content [9,10].
There are several well-accepted constraints for the appropriateness of representational explanations:
such an account should (1) cohere broadly with the actual practices that are used in computational
cognitive science research; (2) allow for misrepresentation, i.e., the representation must be able to “get
it wrong”; (3) provide the principled method for attributing of determinate contents to specific states
or structures (typically internal to the system), and finally (4) be naturalistic, meaning that the account
of semantic content does not itself appeal to semantic terms when defining how the representational
capacity is realized by the physical system, on pain of circularity in reasoning [11,12].
A fundamental and thorny question is whether there is some construct of representation that
not only applies in all cases (i.e., to the construct of neural representations and to our more familiar,
deliberate, everyday representational activities), but that also really explains the intentional relation
between living creatures and their environment. An equally thorny issue involves the ontological
and epistemological status of neural representations: Do such things really exist? Do they have
explanatory value?
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we aim to determine whether or not the construct of
neural representations plays an explanatory role in an increasingly popular framework for the study of
action and cognition in living systems, namely, the variational free-energy principle and its corollary
process theory, active inference. Second, if the postulation of neural representations is warranted
under the free-energy principle, we aim to assess which of the available philosophical positions about
the ontological and epistemological status of representations is most appropriate for the construct
under this framework. Since the issue to be determined cannot merely be decided by appeal to formal
frameworks, we first discuss the issue of representationalism.
In the remainder of this first section, we review the issues surrounding representationalism. In
the second section, we present and motivate the view of the brain under the free-energy principle, as a
self-organizing nonequilibrium steady-state enshrouded by a statistical boundary (called a Markov
blanket). In the following section, we consider non-realist accounts of neural representation: a
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deflationary account, according to which the contents of neural representations are mathematical,
and a fictionalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions. In
the fourth section, we propose to combine aspects of both these accounts, yielding a nuanced realist
account that defines semantic contents of representations formally—what one might call a deflationary,
organism-centered fictionalist interpretation of neural representations. We argue that even pursuing
a minimalist, deflationary account of the content of neural representations under the free-energy
principles licenses an appeal to a robust kind of semantic content, the kind at stake in the ‘aboutness’
or intentionality of cognitive systems. The ensuing position coheres broadly with, but rests on distinct
assumptions from, the realist one.
1.1. The Faces of Representationalism: Realism and Non-Realism
In the philosophy of mind, there are, roughly speaking, two main ways to think about the
ontological status of the neural representation construct, which have implications for the available
epistemological positions. One is realism about neural representations. This view combines two
positions: ontologically, that neural representations really exist (typically, that they are physically
instantiated in the brain); epistemologically, that they are scientifically useful postulates as well [6,13].
Non-realist positions also are available, which do not share all of these assumptions. Non-realists
are either agnostic about the reality of neural representations or explicitly reject the assumption.
Anti-realism says that neural representations do not exist. Several varieties of non-realism are available,
which have different epistemological implications. Eliminationism is the anti-realist view that the
construct of neural representation should be eliminated from scientific practice [14,15]. Instrumentalism
or fictionalism is the non-realist view that argues that neural representations are useful fictions: they are
a scientifically useful way of describing the world [11,12,16–19].
To get clear on which of these positions is most appropriate, it is useful to review the different
versions of the neural representation construct. The classical view of neural representations casts them
as symbolic structures that are realized by brain states and that are manipulated by rule-governed
processes. This follows from the computational theory of mind [3], according to which cognition is the
rule-governed manipulation of symbol-like, internal cognitive structures (i.e., neural representations).
In these classical accounts, the content of a representation is determined either by appealing to an innate
stock of concepts and mechanisms that ensure the accuracy and objectivity of what is represented [3,20];
by accounting for contents through the actions of a biological proper function [21–23]; or by referring
to the phenomenal content of our first-person experience of things in the world [24,25]. All such
accounts have in common a construct of neural representation as an internal symbol (or type) that gets
instantiated (or tokened) in the appropriate circumstances; what varies is how the appropriateness
condition gets implemented. There are also non-representational versions of the computational theory
of mind, which will not concern us here; see Miłkowski [26]; Piccinini [27].
Motivated by parallel distributed processing, connectionist models of neural representations
disagree with proponents of the classical approach over the nature of the representational vehicle; but
agree that the brain harnesses internal cognitive structures that act as the vehicles for content [28,29].
Rather than discrete symbolic structures, the connectionist argues that neural representations are
distributed representations; that is, that they accomplish their function of representing states of affairs
in terms of joint configurations of their activity.
Today, the most popular (and in our view, the most compelling) representationalist accounts
are of the connectionist type. They cast neural representations as structural representations. On this
account, neural representations are able to represent their target domain (i.e., to encode semantic
content about their target domain) because their neural vehicles encode exploitable structural similarities
shared with the target domain [8,30–32]. On this account, representations function much like maps:
they recapitulate the high-order structural features of that domain, for example, its statistical properties;
also see [33]. More specifically, structural representations encode information in a format that the
organism can exploit to guide its behavior, that can afford the detection of errors (i.e., that affords
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misrepresentation), and that can be used for ‘offline’ navigation [8,32,34–36]. Structural representations
operate iconically, via a process “in which the structure of internal representations in the brain come to
replicate the structure of the generative process by which sensory input impinges upon it” ([31], p.
1962).
1.2. Towards Anti-Realism: Deficiencies of the Realist View
Most research in the cognitive sciences and neurosciences tacitly operate on realist assumptions
about neural representation and design experiments that aim at explaining how our experience of, and
action in, the world is mediated by structured bodies of knowledge that are encoded in the networks
of the brain. The existence and explanatory value of neural representations is a basic premise of almost
any psychology textbook. For instance, one can read in The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences:
“Psychology is the science that investigates the representation and processing of information” ([37], p. xl,
emphasis added).
Although realism about mental representation is the default mode of operation in most of the
cognitive sciences and neurosciences, it is not the consensus position. The motivation for adopting
an anti-realist, anti-representationalist approach comes from the observation that, despite enormous
efforts and scientific investment, representations have yet to be naturalized [6,9,38–42]. This is notably
because extant attempts to articulate a theory of neural representation have so far failed to provide
a naturalistic theory of semantic content that does not presuppose the very intentional relation and
representational content that it seeks to explain, securing point (4) discussed above. Thus, scholars
such as Ramsey [43] call for caution about the use of the construct. They argue that often, the appeal to
semantic content is a philosophical gloss that does not add any explanatory value:
“The roles provided by commonsense psychology are those that distinguish different types of
mental representations. What we need and what is not provided by commonsense psychology
is, more generally, the sort of physical condition that makes something a representational state, period.
In functional terms, we would like to know what different types of representations perhaps
have in common, qua representation. Neither commonsense psychology nor computationalism
tells us much about the sort causal/physical conditions that bestow upon brain states the functional
role of representing (at least not directly).” ([43], p. 6, emphasis added)
In the literature, it is quite common to see the selective responsiveness of neural tissue to a
given stimulus described as the representation or encoding of stimuli. This conceptualization is
adopted in the study of perception, particularly to highlight cellular specialization in detecting certain
features of the perceptual object [44–48]; in the study of memory [49,50] and motor activity [51–53]
as well. However, as Ramsey [6] notes, response-selectivity by itself cannot make a physical state
a representation. Many physical states have response-selectivity but are not representations. For
instance, the states of one’s skin vary with the weather (e.g., it gets darker the more it is exposed to the
sun), but we would not (intuitively) count one’s skin as a representation of the sun or weather.
We find approaches in the biological sciences and in the neuroscience less committed to the view
of cognition as a representational process taking place within the boundaries of the brain [54–58].
These views include perceptual and motor control theory [59,60]; robotics [61]; cybernetics [62–65];
and, arguably, the free-energy principle and active inference [56,57,66]. These accounts, which often
hail from embodied and enactive approaches in cognitive science [14,67–70], converge on the idea
that the primary aim of cognition is not internally reconstructing proxies for the structure of a hidden
world, but rather to adapt to and act in an environment.
In this setting, Sprevak [17] suggests that there appear to be two options. We can take a hard-headed
realist assumption that the naturalization of neural representations will eventually succeed. (Even
though no account has succeeded so far.) Alternatively, non-realism (eliminativism and fictionalism)
downplays the value of representation talk in cognitive science. Non-realists observe it is not possible to
define the content of a neuronal representation without conflating it already with the cognitive process:
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We borrow our semantics (and thereby, the content of the representation) from our scientific practice.
More precisely, if the supposed representational content cannot be determined without appealing to
what we know about the cognitive activity itself, then it is the cognitive activity that has explanatory
power. Conversely, if the explanation in terms of the cognitive activity suffices without appealing to an
experimenter-imposed semantics, then there is no reason to postulate representational content. This
may motivate restraining the use of neural representation use to an “informal gloss” [11,16].
The cost of eliminating the construct of neural representation altogether is that it requires a painful
revision of the mainstream representational paradigm in cognitive science. Indeed, we typically appeal
to neural representations to explain goal-directed, probabilistic inference, and decision-making. To abandon
this posit leaves us with the obligation to abandon some of the most powerful explanatory tools that
we can use. Is this legitimate?
1.3. Representations Under the Free-Energy Principle?
The object of this paper is more precisely the status of neural representations in Bayesian
neuroscience, known as the free-energy principle and active inference. In Bayesian neuroscience, the
brain is cast as a statistical organ or inference engine that minimizes its uncertainty about the state of
the world. In this family of theories, the brain is depicted as doing its predictive work by drawing
on probabilistic knowledge about its environment to explain the likely causes of the sensory signals
with which it is bombarded [36,64,71,72]—and to act in ways that bring about its preferred or expected
sensory states [73,74].
Some Bayesian approaches based on predictive coding algorithms for describing canonical
microcircuits in the cortex have strong representationalist commitments [8,31,32,34–36,73,75]. These
accounts argue that the Bayesian brain entails the postulation of structural representations. Thus,
neural representations are taken to be internal, map-like structures that are instantiated in the networks
of the brain and that encode exploitable information.
Several recent papers have discussed whether a realist interpretation of neural representations
is warranted under the free-energy principle [8,32,34,35,56]. Besides a few notable exceptions [76],
few papers have sought to evaluate the variety of non-realist arguments in light of the free-energy
principle. In this paper, we will argue that taking seriously two forms of the non-realist position (the
deflationary and fictionalist views) leads back to a nuanced form of realism that is apt to provide a
naturalistic basis for the study of intentionality.
Why concern ourselves with the ontological and epistemological status of representations? From
our point of view, one main reason to do so is that one’s position with regards to the status of
representations has implications for research in computational neuroscience; and to determine which
structures play the role of representation, and how they carry their semantic contents, is crucial for the
practice of neuroscience. One salient example is that of motor representations and motor commands in
the human brain [77,78]. Representationalist frameworks in computational neuroscience assume that
there exist structures in the brain that represent motor tasks. Optimal control theory is one of the more
popular frameworks for modelling that borrows such assumptions. This approach is underwritten
by strong assumptions about the nature of the models and signals that the brain processes in motor
control. The hypothesis in optimal control is that motor representations are brain structures that encode
explicit instructions to perform a task and that are specified in terms of intrinsic coordinates (i.e., in
terms of the contraction and stretching of muscle fibres). However, optimal control theoretic constructs
have been criticized and empirical evidence is lacking for explicit instruction-like motor commands in
the brain. For discussion, see Hipolito et al. [77]. Our framework offers an alternative characterization
of representational capacities, which are not premised on instruction-like motor commands. Instead,
we characterize the representational capacity as underwritten by an ontology of fictive states, and on a
process of active inference that realizes preferences about sensory data. Our deflationary perspective on
representational capacities does away with the problematic representational posits of optimal control,
while also shedding light on how semantic contents are acquired through histories of active inference.
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2. The Free-Energy Principle and Active Inference: From Information Geometry to the Physics of
Phenotypes
2.1. State Spaces, Nonequilibrium Dynamics, and Bears (Oh My)
Our paper will focus on a prominent Bayesian theory of action and cognition, the variational
free-energy principle, and its corollary, active inference [66,79]. The free-energy principle starts with
the observation that biological systems like living creatures have a phenotype. Living organisms
maintain their phenotypic integrity and resist the tendency towards thermodynamic equilibrium with
their ambient surroundings—that is usually dictated by the fluctuation theorems that generalize the
second law of thermodynamics [80,81]. Living creatures do so by upper bounding the entropy (the
dispersion or spread) of their constituent states. To get a better handle on this, in this section, we
introduce two formal notions: the state space and nonequilibrium steady states. A brief technical
treatment of what follows can be found in the Appendix A and Glossary of terms and expressions.
In physics, equilibrium and nonequilibrium are distinguished by the end-state towards which a
dynamics evolves. Equilibrium dynamics resolve when all the energy gradients have been consumed;
at which the point system is at thermodynamic equilibrium with its environment. For living creatures,
thermodynamic equilibrium is death. Living creatures are open systems that remain far from
equilibrium. How can we model this using formal resources?
The state or phase space formalism comes from dynamical systems theory and allows us to get a
formal grip on the predicament of living systems. A state or phase space is an abstract space that allows
us to model the time evolution of a system in terms of all the possible states in which it can find itself.
To construct a state space, we identify all the relevant quantities that can change in the system (i.e., all
the relevant variables) and then plot each variable on a dimension in an abstract space. This space is
called a state space. Every dimension of this space corresponds to a variable in the system; such that a
point in this space corresponds to a complete instantaneous specification of the system, since we assign
a value to every variable of the system; i.e., we assign a position to the system along every dimension.
A trajectory in this space, in turn, corresponds to the flow of the states of the system over time.
The state space formalism allows us to describe the time evolution of a system implicitly by
depicting trajectories through state space. This turns out to be crucial. If we draw a probability density
over all the states that a system can find itself, those combinations of states with the highest probability,
to which the system returns periodically, are known as a pullback attractor [66,82]. We can associate the
states (i.e., the regions of this space) in which a creature finds itself most of the time with its phenotypic
states.
The probability density that describes the system at its nonequilibrium steady state (i.e., its
phenotypic states) is aptly called the nonequilibrium steady state density. Such a probabilistic description
of the system’s dynamics can be interpreted in two mutually consistent and complementary ways.
First, the system can be described in terms of the flow of the system’s states—that are subject to
random fluctuations—in which case, we can formulate the flow in terms of a path integral formulation,
as a path of least action. Equivalently, we can describe the nonequilibrium steady-state in terms of
the probability of finding the system in some state when sampling at any random time. These two
descriptions are linked mathematically by the fact that at nonequilibrium steady-state, the flow is the
solution to something called the Fokker Planck equation that describes the density dynamics. This
dual interpretation will play a crucial role later.
2.2. Markov Blankets and the Dynamics of Living Systems
The free-energy principle builds on the dynamic systems theoretic approach, which concerns the
time evolution of systems, but now augmented with considerations about the statistical properties
and the measurability of those systems. The free-energy principle allows us to describe the flow
of a system’s states in one of two mathematically equivalent ways, statistical and dynamical—an
equivalence that is warranted by virtue of the conditional independence entailed by the presence of a
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statistical boundary (called a Markov blanket) and the existence of the system in a regime of steady
(phenotypic) states far from equilibrium.
For a system to exist (separately from the rest of the universe), it must be endowed with a degree
of independence from its embedding environment. A Markov blanket is a set of variables or states that
we use to stipulatively individuate a system in terms of what is part of it (internal states, denoted µ),
and what is not (external states, denoted η). The Markov blanket itself is defined as those states that
mediate interactions between the system and its embedding environment (active and sensory states,
denoted a and s). The Markov blanket is defined by the absence of certain connections: internal states
do not cause sensory states, and external states do not cause active states. See Figures 1 and 2.
The presence of a Markov blanket induces a conditional independence between internal and
external variables. The key word here is ‘conditional’: internal and external are not really independent
of one another—they just appear to be so if we discount their dependencies via the blanket states.
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Figure 1. The structure of a Markov blanket. A Markov blanket highlights open systems exchanging
matter, energy, or information with their surroundings. The figure depicts the Markovian partition of
the system or set of states into internal states (denoted µ), blanket states, which are themselves divided
into active states (a) and sensory states (s) states, and external states (η). Internal states are conditionally
independent from external states, given blanket states. Variables are conditionally independent of each
other by virtue of the Markov blanket. If there is no route between two variables, and they share parents,
they are co ditionally independent. Arrows go from ‘parents’ to ‘children’. From Hipólito et al. [83].
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Figure 2. Markov blankets of life. This figure depicts a Markov blanket around a system of interest;
here, the brain. The figure associates the Markovian partition to internal (µ), blanket (b), and external
states (η); where blanket states can be active (a) or sensory (s) states, depending on their statistical
relations to internal and external states. Here, the flow of each kind of state (denoted with a dot) is
expressed as a function of other states in the partition (plus some random noise, denoted ω), as a
function of the independences that are harnessed by the Markov blanket. Autonomous states (α) are
those that follow a free-energy gradient. Particular states (here, denoted π) are those identified with
the system itself (internal and blanket states).
2.3. Information Geometries and the Physics of Sentient Systems
The core intuition behind the free-energy principle is that if a system is endowed with a phenotype
(i.e., a nonequilibrium steady state density) and has a Markov blanket, then there are two ways of
describing the flow of a system’s stat s that turn out to be equivalent: on rooted in th state sp ce
descri tion of the system that is formula ed in terms of the flow or dynamics of the i ternal states; the
other rooted in a statistical interpretation of the s me flow. The pr sence of a Mark v blanket in such a
system ensures tha both d scriptions a e coinci e tally true or conjugate to e ch other [66,84].
This d sc iption of the ystem—in t rms of movement in internal phase space—is the
system’s ‘intrin ic’ information geometry, which is closely related to measure theory and statistical
thermodynamics. Measure theory is a field of mathematics about how we can systematically assign a
number to subsets of a given et, where a easure r metric consists precisely in such an assignm nt; for
example, a p ob bility measure assigns a probability va ue sys ematically to elements of a sub et. We
can think of measures as capturing something bout size, or distances in an abstract space. Generally,
an ar itrary set of points that compose a state space does not have a measure, and so no associ ted
notion of distance can be defined for that space. However, one can equip a space with a metric,
usually in the form of a matrix that des ribes how ‘far’ one h s moved as a function of small changes
in position.
In Eucli ean geometry, this metric is just an identi y matrix, i.e., if I move 100 m along some
particular direction, then I will have moved total of 100 m. This is not true, e.g., of movement on
a sphere: the planet Earth, for instance, has a circumference of approximately 40,000 km; if I move
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(approximately) 40,000 km in the same direction on Earth, I will not have moved at all in total relative
to the Earth’s surface (since I will be back where I started).
This notion of metric plays a special role when dealing with sufficient statistics and statistical
manifolds. Sufficient statistics are the minimal set of numbers that are needed to reconstruct or
parameterize a probability distribution (which contains an infinite number of points). For normal or
Gaussian distributions, these numbers are the mean and variance. A statistical manifold is a space in
which the coordinates are the sufficient statistics of a family of probabilities densities. For instance, the
sufficient statistics of a Gaussian distribution are its mean and variance, giving a two-dimensional
statistical manifold or state space. Given any position on this manifold, it is possible to reconstruct
the probability density (which assigns a probability to an infinite number of points). Trajectories on
a statistical manifold correspond to changes in the shape (i.e., the value of the parameters) of the
associated probability density.
Information geometry, in turn, is the field of mathematics dealing with measures or metrics on a
statistical manifold (information manifolds, typically endowed with a Fisher or Riemannian information
metric). In other words, information geometry allows us to define a metric for probability distributions
(or probability densities for continuous variables); that is, we can talk about distances between
probability densities. Furthermore, if we associate probability densities with probabilistic beliefs, we
now have a naturalized way of talking about the distance between beliefs.
With all this in place, we can appreciate what the free-energy principle brings to the table. Starting
from our state space description of the system, we can define a metric that allows us to speak about
distances between probabilistic configurations of a system’s internal states. Such a geometry is ‘intrinsic’
because it describes the structure of a system’s possible configurations in a manner that only refers
to internal states themselves (rather than the external states of the environment). The free-energy
principle says that so long as the system at hand is equipped with a nonequilibrium steady state density
and a Markov blanket is in play, then an additional—and mathematically conjugate—information
geometry can be defined [66,84]. These two information geometries can take the form of the following
(Fisher information) metrics, where the sufficient statistics correspond to expected thermodynamic
states and internal states, respectively:
g(λ) = ∇λ′λ′D[pλ′(µ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣pλ(µ)]∣∣∣λ′=λ
g(µ) = ∇µ′µ′D[qµ′(η)
∣∣∣∣∣∣qµ(η)]∣∣∣µ′=µ intrinsicextrinsic
This licenses a spectacular observation: namely, that internal states can be interpreted in terms of
their extrinsic geometry, i.e., as parameterising a probability density over external states. This simple
fact is a natural consequence of the conditional independences that define the Markov blanket. Put
simply, for every blanket state (i.e., joint sensory and active state) there is a conditional probability
density over internal and external states. Crucially, these are conditionally independent, by definition,
given the blanket state in question. This means that for every expected internal state, given the blanket
state, there must be a conditional probability density over external states. In turn, this means that the
expected internal state is a statistical manifold—equipped with an extrinsic information geometry.
This extrinsic information geometry describes the distance among probabilistic beliefs about external
states, which are parameterized by the expected internal states. In other words, expected internal states
constitute the sufficient statistics of beliefs about external states.
2.4. Phenotypes: A Tale of Two Densities
Essentially, the free-energy principle is a story about two probability densities [56]. The first is the
nonequilibrium steady state density itself, which harnesses the statistical structure of the phenotype.
The second, variational density, is parameterized or embodied by the internal states of the system. We
have seen that internal states constitute the sufficient statistics of probabilistic beliefs about external
states. Another way of looking at this is to say that internal states encode a probability distribution—the
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variational density—over the states of the external world that are generating sensory (and active) states.
Technically, that a system will evolve towards—and maintain—its nonequilibrium steady state means
that it minimizes the discrepancy between the variational density that it embodies and the probability
density over external states, given blanket states [66,84]. This discrepancy is the variational free-energy,
and the steady state flow that underwrites nonequilibrium steady-state becomes a gradient flow on
variational free-energy. In other words, it will look as if internal states are trying to optimize their
posterior beliefs about external states. When cast in terms of movement in the extrinsic geometry, one
can interpret existential behavior in terms of Bayesian belief updating. This all follows because the
expected internal states parameterize a conditional or Bayesian belief about external states.
Anthropomorphically, the system does not ‘know’ in what state it is in, but it will look as if it
is inferring the state of its external milieu ‘out there’, based on prior beliefs and its current sensory
states. The state of the external world is thus never directly perceived, it is instead something that
the organism infers and brings about actively through interactions with the world. In this sense, the
implicit inference is enactive, in the pragmatist sense of being for action [56,57,85]. When the organism
interacts with the world, it perturbs external states and consequent sensory states. These sensory
impressions couple back to internal states that attune to the world around them. Put otherwise, the
organism engages in a form of Bayesian inference (i.e., active inference), with respect to the state of its
ecological environment, based on the situated interaction.
Why inference? The free-energy principle says that living things exist in virtue of gradient flows
on an information theoretic quantity called surprisal. This is the solution to the Fokker Planck equation
that furnishes nonequilibrium steady-state. Crucially, the dynamics of internal (and active) states
at nonequilibrium steady-state can be cast equivalently as flowing down surprisal or free-energy
gradients. Free-energy scores the atypicality of sensory (and active) states, given a (generative) model
of how those data was generated [66,86,87].
The equivalence between surprisal and free-energy rests upon the fact that the (expected) internal
states parameterize beliefs about external states. When this variational density corresponds to the
density over external states, conditioned on blanket states, surprisal and free-energy are the same.
Crucially, free-energy is a functional (i.e., function of the function) of the variational density and an
implicit generative model. The generative model is just the nonequilibrium steady-state density over
external and blanket states. And can be regarded as a description of how external states generate
blanket states.
In what follows, we will treat the generative model as an implicit attribute of any nonequilibrium
steady-state that possesses a Markov blanket. The generative model is implicit because the only thing
needed to describe self-organization and belief updating are the free-energy gradients. This means
that the free-energy and its generative model are not evaluated or realised explicitly. This is sometimes
referred to as entailing a generative model. [56,88]. In short, the free-energy is a functional of two
densities, the generative model and the variational density encoded by internal states.
For people familiar with information theory, surprisal is also known as self-information, where
the long-term average of self-information is entropy. This means that nonequilibrium steady-state
flows counter the entropy production due to random fluctuations. In turn, this means that the kind of
inference implicit in the flow of autonomous states (namely, internal and active states) underwrites the
existential imperative to maintain a steady-state far from equilibrium.
What the free-energy principle says then, is that so long as a Markov blanket is in play at
nonequilibrium steady state density, gradient flows on surprisal (a function of states) are equivalent
to gradient flows on free-energy (a function of sufficient statistics), where the sufficient statistics
parameterize probability distributions over—or beliefs about—external states. This echoes the
reasoning above about the conjugate information geometries, in terms of dynamics and in terms of
statistics. Gradient flow here just means that the autonomous states (i.e., internal and active states;
see Figure 2) flow down variational free-energy gradients. And this, in turn, is just another way of
talking about action and perception. This scheme, naturalizing action and perception as the gradient
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flow of active and internal states (respectively) on variational free-energy, is known as active inference,
the corollary process theory of the free-energy principle.
The main take-home message is that the free-energy principle casts the phenotype in two
complementary ways: as a flow of states at nonequilibrium steady state (described via an intrinsic
information geometry) and a flow that entails belief updating (described via an extrinsic information
geometry). In virtue of the active states, the apparent role of internal states is not merely to infer the
causes of sensory data, but to generate appropriate patterns of interaction. This means that internal
states could parameterize beliefs about the consequences of action, and facilitate the consequences of
action for beliefs [66]. Generative models are thus not designed to merely do the interpretative work of
determining the true state of the world, they cover the consequences of acting on worldly states.
2.5. Living Models: A Mechanistic View on Goal-Directed, Probabilistic Inference and Decision-Making Under
the Free-Energy Principle
With this setup in place, we are in a position to appreciate how generative models allow organisms
to engage in goal-directed, probabilistic inference, and decision-making under the free-energy principle.
The free-energy principle is often cast as the claim that living systems just are generative models of
their environment [56,76,89–92]. We can now make sense of this seemingly enigmatic claim. The
free-energy principle says that organisms leverage the statistical structure of their acting bodies to
remain in their phenotypic states, where that typical structure is interpreted probabilistically, as a
joint distribution over all systemic states. Decision-making about what to do next is then based on
a probabilistic inference about “what I must be doing, on the assumption that I am a free-energy
minimizing creature.”
Hitherto, we have considered inference as an emergent property of self-organization to
nonequilibrium steady-state. The ensuing Bayesian mechanics is licensed by an equivalence between
surprisal and variational free-energy. In what follows, we can make a further move and describe
creatures or particles in terms of the generative model that defines free-energy. Once we have the
free-energy, we know the gradients. Once we have the gradients, we know the gradient flow. Once we
have the gradient flow, we can naturalize any embodied exchange with the environment.
A typical generative model is depicted in Figure 3. Here, hidden states (η) correspond to the
external states that are hidden from the internal states behind the Markov blanket. The crucial
thing to appreciate is that beliefs about hidden states correspond to a hypothesis—that the organism
embodies—about the causes of its sensations. These hidden states arguably have all the properties
that would make them the content of structural representations [8,31,32,34,35,56,93]. The hidden states
of the generative model are parameterized by the internal states of the system (e.g., the brain) and
encode exploitable information about external states that guide adaptive behavior. We will return to
this point later.
To summarize, the presence of a Markov blanket at nonequilibrium steady state allows us to
associate a living particle or creature with its internal and blanket states. The flow of the internal states
acquires a dual aspect, described by conjugate intrinsic and extrinsic information geometries. These
geometries inherit naturally from the Markovian structure of the partition. The intrinsic information
geometry describes the thermodynamic behavior of internal states (e.g., neuronal dynamics). However,
the internal states also are equipped with an extrinsic geometry, which pertains to the probability
distributions over, or beliefs about, external states that are parameterized by internal states. A gradient
flow of active and internal states on free-energy (action and perception), effectively implements active
inference; namely, inferring external states and planning what to do next. This completes our technical
review of the free-energy principle.
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Figure 3. A generative model. Here, sensory states are observed outcomes, denoted s. The generative
model represents external states as hidden states, denoted η. Depicted in this schema are the likelihood
mapping from hidden states (denot d A), p ior beliefs about th probability of state transitions (B), and
the prio beliefs abou i itial (hidden) states (D). The G term is an expected free-energy that drives
policy selection (π) in elaborate generative mod ls that entail the consequences of action (not shown
here). The form of this generative model assumes discrete states and steps in ime shown from the l ft
to the right. This kind of generative model is known as a hidden Markov model or partially observed
Markov decision process.
3. Deflationary and Fictionalist Accounts of Neural Representation
Having reviewed the technical core of the free-energy principle, we turn to the question of which
interpretive frame—from cognitive science—is est positioned to make sens of it representational
commitments (or lack thereof). Since realist accounts have been reviewed extensively elsewher , we
focus on two novel non-realist accounts.
3.1. A Deflationary Approach to Neural Representation
In this section, we examine an interesting position that accommodates aspects of realism and
non-realism; namely, the function-theoretic, deflationary account of representation [11,16]; for a related
but distinct account focused on the contents of the brain, but which does not appeal to information
geometry under the free-energy principle, see Wiese [94]. We argue that a suitably amended version of
this position yields the best interpretation of representations under the free-energy principle.
A deflationary account of representation [11,16] blazes a path between realism and non-realism:
it is realistic about the existence of neural representations as information processing mechanisms
that can be characterized using computational methods, but a ti-realist about the cognitive contents
of these representations. The deflationary account is the view that sema tic contents ascribed by
scientists merely have an facilitatory role in the explanation of a cognitive capacity; and that whatever
aspect of content is explanatorily useful can be specified mathematically. The account builds upon two
premises: (1) that representations are not individuated or picked out by their contents, but instead by
the mathematical functi n that it helps to realize; (2) that this content is not essentially determined by
a naturalistic relation between states and the structure of the target (i.e., some target domain in the
world), but instead by what the mathematical contents are.
Thus, a deflationary account of representations argues (1) that a computational theory of a
cognitive capacity must provide a functional theoretic characterization of that capacity, where (2) for the
sake of scientific practice, this can be accompanied by an ‘intentional gloss’ or semantic interpretation:
“content is the ‘connective tissue’ linking the sub-personal mathematical capacities posited in the
theory and the manifest personal-level capacity that is the theory’s explanatory target” ([11], p. 253).
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The deflationary account argues that the explanatory work accomplished by representational
theories of cognition consists in providing mathematical (functional-theoretic) analyses of a given
capacity; and that this computational theory is, more often than not, accompanied by a cognitive
or intentional interpretation, which plays a heuristic role, not a strong explanatory one [11,16]. On
this account, the contents of a cognitive capacity can be explained naturalistically by appealing to
the mathematical functions that are realized by a system. This mathematical content is essential to
the computational characterization of the physical process, “if the mechanism computed a different
mathematical function, and hence was assigned different mathematical contents, it would be a different
computational mechanism” ([11], p. 252). This allows for a computational description of the system
that is not yet related to a cognitive activity in a certain environment.
Determining content is, on this account, relatively easy, as the mathematical functions deployed
in computational models can be understood independently of their use by the system being studied,
i.e., independently of the process that is modeled. This happily responds to the most common lacuna
of naturalistic representational theories, which is to presuppose the very content they seek to explain
by appealing to scientific practice. The characterization of the mathematical content of a neural
representation is harnessed in the computational theory proper, which is composed of five elements ([11],
see Figure 3):
1) A mathematical function that is realized by the cognitive system;
2) Specific algorithms that the system uses to compute the function;
3) Representational structures that are maintained and updated by the mechanism;
4) Computational processes that are defined over representational structures.
5) Ecological component: physical facts about the typical operating conditions in which the
computational mechanism typically operates.
To this, it is often added a heuristic cognitive content [11]. This cognitive content corresponds to
observer-based ascriptions of semantics to neural vehicles, often based on reliable covariations between
the responsiveness of neural tissue and stimuli presented to that tissue in experimental settings. On
the deflationary account, these cognitive contents are an “intentional gloss” on the mathematical
characterization provided by the computational theory, which does all the heavy lifting, in explaining
the capacity or process under investigation. The environmental properties that scientists take to the
mechanism to be representing, on this account, are not an essential characterization of the device
or computational theory. Rather, they are simply ascribed to facilitate the explanation of a relevant
capacity, i.e., they are an intentional gloss on the mathematical content.
The pressures inherent to the problem of the determination of content brings the proponents
of non-realist views to downplay the role traditionally attributed to cognitive content [11,12]. On
these views, and against the dominant view in the cognitive sciences, neurosciences, and philosophy,
cognitive content is not the mark of cognition and does not stand in a naturalistic relation between
internal states or vehicles of a representation and the structure of the target domain that it models.
Specifically, the cognitive components that relate the computational mechanism to actual things in the
world are not part of an essential characterization of cognitive activity on the deflationary account;
they help define the explanandum but do not figure in the explanation itself. Instead, cognitive or
semantic content is merely ascribed by experimenters to facilitate the explanation of a relevant capacity.
In a nutshell, what we intuitively take to be the bona fide semantic content of a representation turns
out to be a mere gloss that only has a heuristic role in the construction of a scientific explanation.
This runs the risk of trivializing cognitive content—and the intentional relation that it purports to
naturalize. The deflationary model does offer an approach to explanation in the sciences of the mind
that is perspicuously informative and explanatorily useful to guide research practices in neuroscience.
But this comes at a cost. In the deflationary account of content, the role attributed to cognitive
content becomes so weakened that it is no longer essential to characterizing the cognitive activity;
the only explanatory use of cognitive content is to help scientists systematically make sense of the
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normal operating conditions in which mathematical descriptions of various mechanisms are deployed.
Ultimately, taking the deflationary option seems to undermine the supposed motivation for positing
mental representations in the first place, and turns out to dovetail with radical enactivism [9,15].
3.2. Fictionalism and Models in Scientific Practice
Other accounts are available that have a non-realist and perhaps less resolutely anti-realist
flavor [17,76]. Fictionalist or instrumentalist accounts in the philosophy of science suggest that scientific
models are useful fictions: they are not literally true, but “true enough,” or good enough to make
useful predictions about, and act upon, the world. A fictionalist account of neural representations
suggests that they are useful functions used by scientists to explain intentional behavior: they are
models used by scientists.
In the philosophy of science, model-based approaches [95–98] suggest that the work of science
consists in the comparison of different sorts of models. The notion of “empirical adequacy” or,
heuristically, of the “true enough” occupies a center stage in the debate in epistemology and the
philosophy of science [96–101]. This notion allows some degree of divergence between what the model
postulates and what we find in reality; it entails that models need not be veridical representations of
states of affairs. Scientific progress often rests on idealization, and successful models often deliberately
contain “felicitous falsehoods” that, while not depicting the world as it “really is,” do have value and
explanatory power. Examples of this kind of heuristic use of models include the ideal gas model in
statistical mechanics and the Hardy–Weinberg model in genetics, both of which occupying central
roles in their respective disciplines, but which are not literally true descriptions.
On this account, models play a significant role in the understanding of a subject matter, not despite
the fact they do not accurately reflect the world’s causal structure, but precisely because they are only
“true enough”—they allow researchers to focus on the features that are relevant to the hypothesis being
tested, by excluding non-relevant features [96,97]. It is worth noting that modeling is a non-reductive
context of inquiry, i.e., a target system that is studied using modeling methods does not have to be
reduced to what is modeled [102].
The aim of an explanation is to generate understanding [99,103,104]. Our appreciation of the
explanatory role of models in the practice of science does not depend on a realist interpretation of
models [98]. Models are useful, sometimes independently of their capacity to explain a phenomenon.
If a model provides explanations that do not accurately represent the causes of their target system, it
does not necessarily follow that these explanations are not real explanations [99]. In science, models
can be used, for instance, to build new models [105]. There are non-explanatory uses of models, i.e.,
uses that do not leverage their representational capacities per se [106]. Models can play an explanatory
role despite not accurately representing the properties of the target domain [107].
A subtle question is whether the generative models that figure in the free-energy principle and
active inference are to be interpreted in a realist or instrumentalist way. That is, are the generative
models of the free-energy principle models used by experiments to explain the behavior of cognitive
systems, or are such models literally being leveraged by organisms to remain alive and to act adaptively?
This ambiguity has been highlighted in a recent paper [76]. We turn to this issue next, as we critically
amend the deflationist conception of neural representation.
4. A Variational Semantics: From Generative Models to Deflated Semantic Content
4.1. A Deflationary Account of Content Under the Free-Energy Principle
In this last section, we combine elements of the deflationary and the instrumentalist accounts
of neural representations to propose a kind of organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We
expand upon the ecological component of deflated mathematical content, which we argue leads to
a naturalistic theory of intentionality: a formal theory of semantic content based on the free-energy
principle. The key to formulating a robust mathematical theory of semantic content, one capable of
Entropy 2020, 22, 889 15 of 29
naturalizing intentionality, is to notice that the free-energy principle essentially tells a story about the
mutual attunement between a system and its environment.
In our view, the deflationary view of representational contents downplays the role of the fifth,
ecological component of the computational theory proper. We argue that formulating the ecological
component using the resources of the free-energy principle allows us to salvage the intentionality of
semantic content—and thereby recover a robust conception of content tied to the domain to which it
is intentionally related (or about)—without appealing to the artificial intentional gloss of cognitive
content. The resulting view is of a semantics that emerges naturally from the fact that the system we
are considering is equipped with a dual information geometry of states and beliefs.
The formalism that underwrites the free-energy principle licenses a crucial observation: namely,
that the mathematical structures and processes in play are defined over a state space and, implicitly,
over an associated belief space or statistical manifold [93]. The mathematical framework of the state
space formalism means that the system’s dynamics are defined over states of the system; and that as a
consequence of the associated extrinsic information geometry, we can always associate a semantics to
this intrinsic description.
This semantics comes from the ‘beliefs’ built into the extrinsic information geometry. The term
‘belief’ is used in the sense of ‘belief propagation’ and ‘Bayesian belief updating’, which are just ways
of talking about probability distributions or densities. ‘Beliefs’ in Bayesian terms are posteriors and
priors, corresponding to the probability distributions (a world of possible states) that are shaped by
physically realized states (i.e., the internal states that parameterize distributions over external states).
In general, although we use the term ‘beliefs’ to describe the probability densities defined over external
states, it is generally recognized that these densities are not themselves the same as propositional
beliefs. In brief, propositional beliefs have truth conditions; that is, they are the kind of thing that
can be true or false [15]. The probability densities at play here are not of this kind; they represent the
manner in which variables covary. This does not imply truth-conditionality, which means that they
are non-propositional.
It is often noted that one does not obtain semantic content from mere systematic
covariation [6,15,108]. However, this argument can be defeated by noting that, under the free-energy
principle, for any living system, there is an implicit semantics at play that is baked into the system’s
dynamics. Importantly, that is just saying that the system’s internal dynamics have a probabilistic aspect
(and extrinsic information geometry) that connects it to an embedding system. Via the Markovian
partition, we can always associate this trajectory of states on internal (statistical) manifold to a
semantics—a formal semantics that falls out of the systemic dynamics and that can be characterized
purely mathematically.
Thus, we obtain a bona fide formal semantics from interactions between the system and its context,
as well as the histories of environmental interactions between an organism and its niche. What follows
from our account is a somewhat more ‘realistic’ deflationary position, a weakly deflationary position
according to which the content of a representation is indeed the mathematical function that it realizes,
but where this computational theory proper entails an implicit semantics.
4.2. From a Computational Theory Proper to a Formal Semantics
Let us now take stock. We have retained the general description of representational content from
the deflationary account. We now use this deflationary model to specify the computational theory
proper that leads to a formal semantics via the free-energy principle.
The computational theory proper has five components, which we can map to elements of the
free-energy formulation. (1) Under the free-energy principle, the mathematical function that is realized
by the (gradient flows of the) cognitive system is a free-energy functional that measures the divergence
between the posterior and variational densities. (2) The specific algorithms that the system uses to
compute this function is gradient descent on variational free-energy. (3) Echoing the literature on
structural representations, the representational structures that are maintained and updated by the
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mechanism are the internal states of the system. (4) The computational processes that are defined over
these representational structures, and which update and maintain them, are implemented as active
inference. (5) Finally, the ecological component is provided by the dual information geometry.
Figures 4 and 5 reformulates Egan’s [11] account deflationary account of content in light of the
free-energy principle. We amend the deflationary account to highlight that it provides us with a fully
naturalistic, mathematical account of the origin of semantic content, in terms of a calculus of beliefs
and intentions that is the counterpart of the intrinsic description of the flow of internal states. Note that
the external states that figure in the generative model implicitly define the ecological component—and
this, purely mathematically. This overcomes the problem of naturalizing intentionality by appealing
purely to well understood mathematical and physical processes and properties.
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Figure 4. The deflationary account of the content of a representation. This figure depicts the main
components of the semantic content of neural representations according to the mathematical-deflationary
account of content [11]. The computational component of the representational content (the
computational theory proper) is interpreted in a realist sense. The computational component of
the content comprises (1) a mathematical function, (2) specific algorithms that realize this function in
the system, (3) physical structures that bear representational contents; (4) computational processes
that secure these contents, and (5) normal ecological conditions under which the system can operate.
The cognitive content is taken in an anti-realist sense, as a kind of explanatory gloss that only
has an explanatory, instrumentalist role, as the interpretation given to the neural representation by
the experimenter.
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are, in essence, formalized under the physics of flow (e.g., dynamical systems theory) and information
geometry, and they are better understood as internal structures enabling the system to parse its
sensory stream (i.e., as an ontology). Here, we relate the main components of the deflationary account
of content [11] to the free-energy formulation. The mathematical function that underwrites the
free-energy principle is a variational free-energy functional. The specific algorithm is gradient descent
(i.e., flow) on this free-energy functional, which defines the gradients on which the system ‘surfs’
until it reaches a nonequilibrium steady state. Representational structures (i.e., the structures that
embody or carry out these processes) correspond to the internal states of a system and associated
intrinsic information geometry. The computational process itself is active inference, which provides an
overarching framework to use the generative model for policy (action) selection. Finally, the ecological
component is defined by the implicit semantics that is entailed by the dual (intrinsic and extrinsic)
information geometries: via the associated extrinsic information geometry, the system looks as if it
behaves as a functional of beliefs about external states.
4.3. Phenotypic Representations? Ontologies?
Our last move is to leverage the fictionalist account to nuance the claim that the account just
rehearsed vindicates the neural representations construct. This nuance is on two counts: with regards to
the terms ‘neural’ and ‘representations’.
First, the term ‘neural’ should be replaced by ‘phenotypic’, to reflect the expanded realization
base of the vehicles of deflated, mathematical content under the free-energy principle. The spirit
of deflated neural representationalism is vindicated by the free-energy principle. We can indeed
assign mathematical content to structures that are internal to an agent, which come to encode or
carry semantic content when the right ecological conditions are in play (thanks to the dual aspect
information geometries of living systems). However, the internal states that play this role are very far
from classical representations in the symbolic or connectionist traditions. They essentially comprise
all internal states of a system and so are not strictly neural. This has the consequence that the neural
representationalist intuition is vindicated by its traditional adversary, the embodied-enactive approach
to cognition: if there is anything like structural representations under the free-energy principle, they
correspond to the system’s bodily states and are harnessed, maintained, and updated through histories
of adaptive action.
Second, with respect to the term ‘representation’, we note that under the free-energy principle,
the deflated representational structures may best be understood as the ontology that system brings to
bear in understanding its environment; that is, the set of hypotheses or categories that it uses to parse
the flow of its sensory states.
Heuristically, we say that the free-energy principle licenses the claim that the system believes that
this or that environmental factor is causing its sensory impressions. In light of the discussion above, it
appears more accurate to say that, when it is in its usual ecologically valid operating conditions, a
system equipped with such a partition that exists at nonequilibrium steady state will act in a way that
looks as if it has an intentional relation with some features of its environment. We now know what this
“as if” character amounts to: it refers to the duality of information geometries and thereby the duality
of possible descriptions (in terms of a flow towards nonequilibrium steady state and in terms of belief
updating under a generative model).
The free-energy principle descends from a modeling strategy called generative modeling. In this
scheme, we write down alternative probabilistic models of the process that caused our data, and we
score the probability of each model as a function of how well it explains the variance in our data. This
score is the variational free-energy. Crucially, as discussed in the previous section, these models are
hypotheses about the structure of the process that caused our data. The hidden or latent (c.f., external) states
in these models are essentially guesses about the causes of sensory data. Crucially, they need not reflect
the existence of anything in reality [66,84,109]. This is a subtle but important point. The external states
exist only relative to the generative model and accompanying phenotype, and only play a role so long
as they subtend the generation of adaptive, contextually appropriate behavior.
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What is being described by the formalism that underwrites the free-energy principle, then, is
less a story about how an internal reconstruction of the external world is constructed in the brain, as
traditional (symbolic and connectionist) accounts of neural representations would have it. What is at
stake is more like the ontology with which a system is equipped [110]. An ontology, in this sense, is the
set of semantic structures (a large part of which are learned through experience from immersion in
specific contexts) that a living creature uses, implicitly or explicitly, to parse and order the flow of its
sensory states [111–114].
We are effectively combining the deflationary account and the fictionalist or instrumentalist account
to provide an interpretation that might be called organism-centered functionalism. The organism’s
phenotype—its moving and acting body—is a nonequilibrium steady state density that can be
interpreted as a manifold towards which the flow of system’s states settles on average and over time;
and also as a joint probability distribution over all the variables of the system. The organism’s behavior
is driven by these density dynamics: by the tendency to settle towards its nonequilibrium steady state
density, which is implemented as a gradient descent on variational free-energy (a.k.a. active inference).
This is just another way of saying that the actions selected by the organism are driven by the
statistical structure of its phenotype and interactions with the environment. The organism leverages
its own statistical structure in driving its action selection. This dovetails with embodied-enactive
approaches to cognition and effectively constitutes a new take on morphological, developmental, and
evolutionary computation [115,116] and knowledge-driven skillful action [77].
While our aim here was to explore the consequences of non-realist approaches to cognition,
we note that the pragmatist interpretation that we propose may be compatible with certain realist,
structural representationalist accounts, where content is determined by functional isomorphism, thereby
illuminating the role of structural representations using a form of functional role semantics [8,32,81].
These accounts are explicitly developed in a direction that does not require the represented system to
actually exist in reality, which coheres with the account of ontologies just presented. The free-energy
principle warrants the claim that there are phenotypic states that carry semantic content; here, we
articulated a computational theory proper for such mathematical semantics. What we call these states,
at the end of the day, may be a matter of preference.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we aimed to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an
explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle, and to determine which philosophical
position about the ontological and epistemological status of the representations construct is most
appropriate for that theory. We examined non-realist approaches, rather than the more commonly
discussed realist ones. We started by a deflationary account of mental representation, according to
which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, and a fictionalist
account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions. We hope to have shown
that under the free-energy principles, even quite minimalist, deflationary accounts of the kind of
content carried by neural representations warrant an appeal to a semantic content, which echoes (while
being distinct from) the realist position. We hope to have shown that, by drawing on a modified
fictionalist account, the formal semantics derived from the free-energy principle can provide us with
an explanation of the aboutness or intentionality of living systems.
Much hangs philosophically on what it means to represent some target domain, specifically in
terms of the relation between mental states and the physical states that realize them. The relations
between the free-energy principle and classical positions in the philosophy of mind (e.g., physicalist
monism, dual-aspect monism, and Cartesian dualism) have been explored at length elsewhere [84].
We will only comment on which of these seems to cohere most with our account. Briefly, of the
philosophical perspectives on the relation between mental and physical states, ours here is most
consonant with functionalism and the concept of multiple realization that it entails. Functionalism
is the view that the features that characterized mental states are not the intrinsic features of that
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state, but rather the functional (e.g., input-output) relations between that state and other states of
the system [117,118]. Multiple realization is the view that the same (mental) macrostate state can be
realized variously by different configurations of (physical) microstates, so long as they implement
the appropriate functional (e.g., computational) relations [118]. The proximity between our view
and functionalism is based on the technical detail of how the semantic content is realized under the
free-energy principle, via the assignment of fictive external states to internal states implied by the
dual information geometry of the free-energy principle. As discussed above, the free-energy principle
licences the claim that, for every blanket state, we can identify an average of internal states that we can
associate with the parameters of a probability density over (fictive) external states. The crucial thing to
note is that it is the average of internal states that can be so associated. This means that the probability
density over external states can be realized by an equivalence class of internal states, which end of
parameterizing the same belief.
An outstanding issue is whether the framework on offer is able to account for the issue of
misrepresentation. Any candidate representational structure must at least in principle be able to
misrepresent the state of affairs that it represents. This has long been a sticking point in the discussion
on representation [119]. In a nutshell, because misrepresentation is possible (e.g., recognizing one
object as another that it is not), an account of representation needs to allow for misrepresentation while
also specifying what makes the representation about one object versus another—if it can be induced
by both objects [3,120]. It has been pointed out, in our view correctly, that the information theoretic
measures used under the free-energy principle are measures of mere covariance, which are insufficient
to account for misrepresentation [108]. We think that this picture is incomplete. A future direction
for more fully addressing this issue begins by noting that variational free-energy scores the degree to
which sensory data conforms to hypotheses about what caused it. Variational free-energy is a not just
any measure of information, but instead measures the discrepancy between the current sensory data
and the sensory data expected under some ontology or hypothesis, which lends it an irreducibly semantic
aspect. High free-energy indicates that the hypothesis does not ‘explain’ the data, or that some other
hypothesis would fare better. Thus, the model of semantics on offer might be able to account for
misrepresentation and the search for alternative hypotheses.
Our primary concern in this paper was to show that phenotypic states can come to acquire
semantic contents of a deflationary (mathematical) sort via active inference. Of note is that this semantic
content is not equivalent to the kind of propositional content that is at play in language use, nor does
our account explain the manners in which human agents use language and narrative to fashion and
remake themselves as agents [121,122]. While this issue is, at least arguably, beyond the scope of
this paper, we generally agree with the claim that the move from semantic to propositional content
requires that agents engage in specific kinds of content-involving practices. These are practices like
truth-telling [9,15] and story-telling [123], which build greatly upon the basic representational or
semantic capacity of agents by enabling more elaborate, storied, forms of self-access that would not be
possible without language.
Where does this leave us with regard to our initial questions? The upshot of our discussion
is that, under the free-energy principle, there indeed are structures internal to an organism that act
as the bearers of semantic content. These structures can be specified mathematically in terms of
computational theory proper, as held by the deflationary account. However, by virtue of the dual
information geometries in play under the free-energy principle, this purely mathematical account
comes with an implicit semantics: the set of hypotheses about underlying causal factors (or the ontology)
with which the system parses and makes sense of its sensory stream. This might be seen as vindicating
the structural representationalist account discussed in the introduction, albeit with a critical twist: those
structures that bear content are not merely neural representations, but indeed phenotypic representations
(if they are representations at all), for it is all the internal states of an organism, given the Markovian
partition, that bear this content.
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Appendix A
A.1. The Langevin Formalism and Density Dynamics
One can express a random dynamical system in terms of the flow of states over time that are
subject to random fluctuations (please see glossary for a definition of variables):
.
x(τ) = f (x, τ) +ω( 1) (A1)
This is a general specification of (Langevin) dynamics that underwrites nearly all of
physics [124–126]; in the sense that most modern physics is premised on the Langevin formalism
and the ensuing descriptions of the flow of a system’s states under random fluctuations. This can be
equivalently described in terms of density dynamics—via the Fokker Planck equation or Schrödinger
equation—or the path integral formulation. From these descriptions, nearly all quantum, statistical
and classical mechanics can be derived.
We are interested in systems that have measurable characteristics, which means that they possess
an attracting set or manifold, known as a random or pullback attractor [82]. This means that if we
observe the system at a random time, there is a certain probability of finding it in a particular state.
This is the nonequilibrium steady-state density [126].
One can now use standard descriptions of density dynamics to express the flow of states as a
gradient flow on self-information or surprisal [127–130]. This flow is the steady-state solution to Fokker
Planck equation that accompanies (A1) [131–135].
f (x) = (Q− Γ) · ∇=(x)
=(x) = − ln p(x)
(A2)
This equation says that, on average, the states of any random dynamical system with an attracting
set evince a gradient flow on surprisal; namely, the negative logarithm of the nonequilibrium
steady-state density [136,137]. The gradient flow effectively counters dispersion due to random
fluctuations, such that the probability density does not change over time. See Figure 4.
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Figure A1. Density dynamics and pullback attractors. This figure depicts the density or ensemble
dynamics of random dynamical systems that can be described via the Langevin equation. The left
panel depicts the time evolution of two states, as a strange attractor. A point in this space assigns to the
system a position along each dimension, and so assigns a value to each state. Here, each dimension
represents one of the two states, and the trajectory plots the evolution of states over time. The right panel
represents an arbitrary random attractor (a pullback attractor). One can think of this pullback attractor
in two ways. First, the attractor can be cast as representing the trajectory of systemic states over time
(in this case, two states are represented). The crucial feature of this trajectory is that—after sufficient
time has passed—it will revisit specific regions of state space, which make up the pullback attractor
itself. The second interpretation is probabilistic: it casts the attracting set as a probability density over
the states in which the system can be found when it is sampled at random. The Fokker-Planck equation
allows us to describe the evolution of this probability density. This, in turn, licences a solution to the
Fokker-Planck equation. The consequence of this is that we can establish a lawful relationship between
the probability density and the flow of states at any point in the system’s state space. This solution
describes the flow of systemic states in terms of gradients of log density or surprisal and in terms of
the amplitude of random fluctuations. In turn, the Helmholtz decomposition allows us to express the
nonequilibrium steady-state solution in terms of two orthogonal components. One of these is a curl-free
gradient flow that depends on the amplitude of random fluctuations Γ. This component rebuilds
probability gradients, effectively countering the effect of random fluctuations on states (i.e., countering
their dispersion). The other component is a divergence-free (or solenoidal) flow that circulates on
isoprobability contours and that depends upon an antisymmetric (skew) matrix Q. The figure depicts
the flow around the peak of a probability density that has a Gaussian or normal form. See [66,137,138]
for technical details.
The above equation holds (nontrivially) for the internal, blanket, and external states. If we just
focus on internal and active (i.e., autonomous) states, we have the following flows. Note that as in (A2)
Qαα and Γαα denote antisymmetric and leading diagonal matrices, respectively.
fα(π)= (Qαα − Γαα)∇α=(π)
α=
{
a,µ
}
π= {s,α} =
{
b,µ
} (A3)
This means anything a system with a Markov blanket must evince the above gradient flows. In
turn, t i that internal and act ve states will loo as if they are trying t minim se the same
q a tity; namely, the surprisal of st tes that const tute the thing, particle, or creature. Th se are the
internal and blanket states, i.e., particular states.
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A.2. Bayesian Mechanics
If internal and external states are conditionally independent, then for every given blanket state
there is an expected internal state and a conditional density over external states. In other words, there
must be a one-to-one relationship between the average internal state of a particle (or creature) and a
probability density over external states, for every given blanket state. This means that we can express
the posterior or conditional density over external states as a variational density that is parameterised by
internal states:
qµ(η)= p(η
∣∣∣b) = p(η∣∣∣π)
µ(b), E[µ
∣∣∣b] (A4)
This allows us to interpret the flow of autonomous states α = {a,µ} (i.e., action and perception) as
a gradient flow on variational free energy.
fα = (Qαα − Γαα)∇αF(b)
F(b) , Eq[=(η, b)]︸       ︷︷       ︸
energy
−H[qµ(η)]︸    ︷︷    ︸
entropy
= =(b)︸︷︷︸
surprisal
+ D[qµ(η)
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(η∣∣∣b)]︸               ︷︷               ︸
bound
= Eq[=(b
∣∣∣η)]︸       ︷︷       ︸
inaccuracy
+ D[qµ(η)
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(η)]︸             ︷︷             ︸
complexity
= =(b)
(A5)
This functional can be expressed in several forms; namely, an expected energy minus the entropy
of the variational density, which is equivalent to the self-information associated with blanket states (i.e.,
surprisal) plus the KL divergence between the variational and posterior density (i.e., bound), which, in
this instance, is zero by (A4). In turn, this can be decomposed into the expected log likelihood of blanket
states (i.e., accuracy) and the KL divergence between posterior and prior densities (i.e., complexity).
The second thing that (A4) brings to the table is an information geometry and attending calculus of
beliefs. From now on, we will associate beliefs with the probability density above that is parameterised
by (expected) internal states. Note that these beliefs are non-propositional, where ‘belief’ is used
in the sense of ‘belief propagation’ and ‘Bayesian belief updating’ that can always be formulated as
minimising variational free energy [139–141]. To license a description of this conditional density in
terms of beliefs, we can now appeal to information geometry [135,142–144].
Note the variational free energy—and its gradients—are functionals of a generative model =(η, b) =
− ln p(η, b) in the form of a surprisal over external and blanket states. This means that the nonequilibrium
steady-state density over the states can be read as a generative model that underwrites autonomous
gradient flows.
A.3. Information Geometry and Beliefs
Any statistical manifold is necessarily equipped with a unique metric tensor, known as the Fisher
information metric [135,142,145].
d`2= gi jdµidµ j
g(µ)= ∇µ′µ′D[qµ′(η)
∣∣∣∣∣∣qµ(η)]∣∣∣µ′=µ = Eq[∇µ ln qµ(η) ×∇µ ln qµ(η)] (A6)
Here, d` is the information length associated with small displacements on the statistical manifold
dµ = µ′ − µ induced by a probability density qµ(η). The information length scores the number of
different probabilistic or belief states encountered in moving from one part of a statistical manifold
to another.
Entropy 2020, 22, 889 23 of 29
If we return to the independencies induced by the Markov blanket, Equation (A4) tells us
something fundamental. The (expected) internal states have acquired an information geometry,
because they parameterise probabilistic beliefs about external states. In short, there is a unique
geometry in some belief space that can be associated with the internal (physical) state of any particle or
creature. Furthermore, we know that the gradient flows describing the dynamics of internal states can
be expressed as a gradient flow on a variational free energy functional (i.e., function of the function) of
beliefs: see (A5).
Recall from above, that an information geometry is a property of any statistical manifold. The
parameters of the probability density over the internal states are thermodynamic variables λ (e.g.,
pressure) that underwrite thermodynamics or statistical mechanics [145,146]. We will refer to the
accompanying information geometry as an intrinsic geometry, because pertains to the internal states
per se. From our point of view, this means there are two information geometries in play with the
following metrics:
g(λ)= ∇λ′λ′D[pλ′(µ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣pλ(µ)]∣∣∣λ′=λ
g(µ)= ∇µ′µ′D[qµ′(η)
∣∣∣∣∣∣qµ(η)]∣∣∣µ′=µ intrinsicextrinsic (A7)
First, there is an intrinsic information geometry based upon thermodynamic variables. This forms
the basis of statistical mechanics in physics. At the same time, there is an information geometry in
the space of internal states that refers to belief distributions over external states. This is the extrinsic
information geometry that inherits from the Markovian conditions that define, stipulatively, autonomous
states (via their Markov blanket). The extrinsic geometry is conjugate to the intrinsic geometry, in the
sense that they supervene on the same Langevin dynamics.
Glossary
(Note: a.u. stands for arbitrary units, e.g., metres (m), radians (rad), etc.)
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Expression Description Units
Variables
ω(τ) Random fluctuations
a.u.
(m)
x =
{
η, s, a,µ
}
∈ X
Markovian partition into external, sensory, active, and
internal states
a.u.
(m)
α =
{
a,µ
}
∈ A Autonomous states
a.u.
(m)
b = {s, a} ∈ B Blanket states
a.u.
(m)
π =
{
b,µ
}
∈ P Particular states
a.u.
(m)
η ∈ E External states
a.u.
(m)
Γ = µmkBT Amplitude (i.e., half the variance) of random fluctuations J·s/kg
Q Rate of solenoidal flow J·s/kg
` =
∫
d` : d`2 = gi jdλ jdλi Information length nats
gi j = E
[
∂=
∂λi
∂=
∂λ j
]
Fisher (information metric) tensor a.u.
Functions, functionals and potentials
E[x] = Ep[x] =
∫
xpλ(x)dx Expectation or average
pλ(x) : Pr[X ∈ A] =
∫
A pλ(x)dx
Probability density function parameterised by sufficient
statistics λ
qµ(η)
Variational density – an (approximate posterior) density
over external states that is parameterised by internal states
F(b) ≥ =(b)
Variational free energy free energy – an upper bound on
the surprisal of particular states
nats
Operators
∇x=(x) = ∂=∂x =
(
∂=
∂x1
, ∂=∂x2 , . . .
)
Differential or gradient operator (on a scalar field)
Entropies and potentials
=(x) = − ln p(x) Surprisal or self-information nats
D[q(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣p(x)] = Eq[ln q(x) − ln p(x)] Relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler divergence nats
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